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AIR

MON-A-274

27 June 1949

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Comdr 4th ALGERIA - Report on the "Standarte Kurt Eggers" Group.
MON-A-268

With reference to paragraph 8 of the above dispatch, we are submitting herewith a report on the actual field activities of the Standarte Kurt EGGER'S Group.

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Encls:
GIC Report dtd 5 Jan 49

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31054
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1. Enclosure

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FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

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8 January 1949

SUBJECT: Gunter d'ALQUEN

Re: Personnel

a. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION:

(1) Reference is made to Top Secret Letter, Headquarters, 7970th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, file number: D-242953, Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEN, dated 7 December 1948.

b. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY:

The EBI's given in the referenced letter have been developed and their development herein forwarded. In deference to readability, the EBI's as given in the referenced letter are repeated at the beginning of each paragraph as follows:

DEVELOPMENT OF EBI NO. 5a:

What were the fundamental reasons for the inauguration of such a plan and why did the German High Command wait until 1944 to conduct a campaign of psychological warfare against their enemies?

(1) The German High Command did not wait until 1944 in beginning a psychological warfare campaign. In 1944 merely a regrouping of forces and leadership and an overhauling of means and methods took place. The final result of this organizational regrouping was the taking over of psychological warfare by the Standarte "Kurt HOGGER". As of the beginning of the war German psychological warfare existed. It was, however, highly limited by the conservative and purely professionally militaristic conception of the authoritative forces. As of the beginning of the war the department WPR (Wehrmachts-Propaganda) headed by the then Colonel (later General) Hasso von WEDDEL existed in the OKW (Oberkommando Wehrmacht). This department (WPR) controlled the propaganda companies which were in the lower levels. The tasks of these propaganda companies, aside from their war correspondent activities for the home press, radio and film, were to publish and distribute newspapers and to compose and broadcast radio programs to the fighting troops. One (1) "active" propaganda platoon was included in every propaganda company. The task of the "active" propaganda platoon was to direct propaganda at the enemy. Since only one (1) propaganda company was attached to every army, only a single platoon was at the disposal of an army for "active" propaganda. The BERLIN (NSG/276) Central Headquarters of the OKW/WPR had only a small military and no political authority. It gave its directives to the STOPROPS (Stabsoffizier fuer Propaganda-Einsatz - Staff Officer for Propaganda Activities) who was supervised by the 1-C (corresponds to US Army G-2) of the Heeres Group. The STOPROP was thus the chief of the propaganda companies. The number of these propaganda companies which a given STOPROP had depended upon the number of armies in the (his own) Heeres Group. The Propaganda companies, however, were supervised by the 1-C of the armies in

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Enclosure 1 - # 31054

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III-M-2085, S/R Marburg, Ref. III, 7970 CIC Gp, APO 872, dtd 5 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEN.

question. The platoon for "active" propaganda was controlled by the chief of the propaganda company. Since authority was forced to filter through such tortuous and ramified channels, OKW/WFR was, only after great difficulties, in a position to send directives and instructions following the higher viewpoints to the platoons for "active" propaganda. In reality, only local activity was engaged in by these "active" propaganda platoons and then only such programs were activated as one hundred per cent soldiers considered correct. At any rate, OKW/WFR was not, before 1944, in a position to formulate or to order a political line as a basis for active propaganda. War was started against Russia without any political conception. While the German troops were enthusiastically welcomed in many places (especially in the Ukraine and the Baltic countries) as liberators from the Bolshevistic terror and while hundreds of thousands of prisoners and deserters would have been willing to continue the war against the Bolsheviks on the German side, the "active" propaganda was lacking the spiritual weapon which could have furthered this development. In OKW/WFR there were good experts, good connoisseurs of Russia and the mentalities of her nations. Their hands were bound, however, due to the Russian doctrine of the ruling Nazis whose aim was not the liberation from Bolshevism, as desired by the Russian peoples, but was the winning of "Lebensraum" (living space) and colonial territory. Every attempt to convert the urge for liberty on the part of the Russian peoples into a subject for psychological warfare, thusly a weapon against Soviet mass conscription, failed because HIMMLER, ROSENBERG, KOCH, etc. were afraid that this promise of liberty could not be revoked later on. Under these circumstances "active" propaganda could only be desultory. It confined itself to general anti-Bolshevistic commonplaces and was devoid of any kind of a coherent political program. Positive beginnings remained beginnings as soon as they passed from their area of origin. No one was in a position to begin building upon an "active" propaganda success at the point at which another had left off. The foundation of the so-called "SMOLENSK Committee" (Reference is made to Agent Report, S/R Marburg, Marburg file III-M-2085, SUBJECT: VLASSOV Liberation Movement, paragraph b(1) (h),) by the help of Captain von GROTHE is a good example that "active" propagandic beginnings remained beginnings because of high level objection to a "liberation from Bolshevism" theme. (For further information concerning von GROTHE, reference is submitted to Agent Report, S/R Marburg, Marburg file III-M-2085, Subject: Nicolaus von GROTHE, dated 24 November 1948). The "SMOLENSK Committee" was only a fictitious propaganda idea but later resulted in the VLASSOV program. General VLASSOV, as well as the other members of this figmentary committee, were held as prisoners in BERLIN, and the "Committee" existed only on leaflets which told the Russians that in SMOLENSK there was an anti-Bolshevistic counter-movement established and that the liberation aspect of the war had received a Russian leadership. The success of this propaganda program which was carried out only upon a local level exceeded all expectations and its military reaction was lasting to such a degree that other army units petitioned for the same or similar programs. But this propaganda subject was contrary to the political aims of the Nazis and consequently further activities in this direction were prohibited. Though the efficiency of psychological warfare based upon a constructive political program, that is to say, based upon a natural hunger of peoples for the improvement of political conditions leading to eventual freedom, was proved in this (1) one case, "active" propaganda continued its work according to local viewpoints and the usual desultory way. It was based upon what localized units had found by trial and error to be successful. That is to say, that it was

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based upon what localized units had found to be the psychological and military weak points of the enemy. In BERLIN, the OKW/APR fought a political battle behind the scenes but did not succeed in bringing a sufficient wealth of practicable ideas to the "active" propaganda troops. The Standarte "Kurt EGGERS" originated from one (1) war correspondent company of the Waffen SS. The tasks of this unit were at first limited to the field of war correspondent activities. Its platoons were attached to and not included in the divisions of the Waffen SS. These platoons were attached in a "Detached Service" sense. Due to the fact that these Waffen SS divisions fought in the greater Wehrmacht organizations which had their own platoons for "active" propaganda until 1944, there was no self-contained Waffen SS "active" propaganda. Necessarily following, there was no self-contained "active" propaganda emanating from the Waffen SS war correspondent company that was later to become the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS".

(2) In the fall of 1943, the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS" was composed of approximately twenty-seven (27) field units which numbered approximately one hundred fifty (150) officers and approximately sixteen hundred (1,600) NCO's and enlisted men. Large numbers of non-German volunteers came into the Waffen SS (The volunteering of foreigners for Wehrmacht service was not permitted). Because of the number of these volunteers, subjects of fifteen (15) European nations did service as officers and EM in the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS". Many of these non-Germans were of professions and occupations which made them especially suitable for propaganda tasks. There were correspondents, writers, radio technicians, speakers, film technicians, specialists for graphic art, designers and linguists. The Standarte represented a notable concentration of anti-Bolshevistic intellectual forces.

(3) By the end of 1943, all possibilities within the Standarte for invention and progress in the field of pure war correspondence were exhausted. In spite of the small number of men and the limited organizational and technical means it had outstripped the other war correspondent units and had a proportionate lead in the fields of war reporting for the newspapers, radio and newsreels for Germany and several other countries. The superiority of the Standarte's work was acknowledged in the Army, the Luftwaffe and in the Navy. It owed this superiority to its centralized leadership, the independence of its field units to local jurisdiction, its self-contained courier service, its own centralized organization for the evaluation of incoming material and to the fact that its units had a reputation in front of the fighting troops as being composed of men who had received good military training and who were efficiently led. Especially decisive for the later development was the fact that the front units of the Standarte were exclusively under the central command of its commanding officer (Gunter d'ALQUEM). Satisfactory accomplishment of the tasks which were posed for the Standarte later on could only have been effected by a unit accustomed to such a method. This central command provided for the protection for and the fostering of individual initiative on the part of subordinate unit chiefs. A subordinate unit chief knew that he was responsible only to the Standarte's commanding officer and was thus freed from angular pressure. In a position corresponding to that of a Regimental Commander whose units were scattered over the entire Russian front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea,

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d'ALQUEN was able to logically criticize the Russian front's psychological warfare situation and point out the fact that there were many un-used opportunities for influencing the enemy by propaganda. HIMMLER was for quick action and a practical test. He ordered that the Standarte begin a large-scale test-attempt. The Standarte was to try with all means known at that time in the "active" propaganda field, in a solid front line, and to make a scientific analysis of the result. d'ALQUEN was given the full authority necessary to carry out this test-attempt program. "Unternehmen Wintermaerchen" (Enterprise Winter Legend), later carried out along the Oranienbaum-Leningrad Pocket lines, was thus authorized. This front section was selected since it was stable at that time and since the commander of this section, General STEINER of the Waffen SS, was a personal acquaintance of d'ALQUEN'S and implemented a full freedom of action. The test-attempt represented by "Unternehmen Wintermaerchen" continued for several months and even continued when the front became unstable and the German front line units were withdrawn to the Narva line. Apart from officers and EM of the Standarte, units of the artillery and Luftwaffe as well as Russian volunteers participated. Loudspeakers, leaflets distributed by mortars (in a specially developed rocket-propelled shell), airplanes and artillery were used. These leaflets were also distributed by "front crossers" who infiltrated through the enemy lines. All thinkable political, military, moral and religious arguments were used in morale deterioration attempts. All prisoners and deserters were carefully investigated. The degree of propaganda influence to which they had been exposed was calculated and noted with scientific thoroughness. It was found that by far the greatest successes had been achieved through allusions which could be brought to the common denominator, "VLASSOV Line". It was proved that, aside from local profits, great and lasting effects can only be obtained by basing propaganda upon a positive political construction.

(4) After HIMMLER had been informed of these results, he gave a report to HITLER, who immediately ordered that a similar program be carried out by the Standarte on the Italian front. This program was called "Unternehmen Suedstern" (Enterprise Southern Star). The task of "Unternehmen Suedstern" was the morale-deterioration of the British-led Polish units fighting there. The enterprise was started in 1944 and the known means were used. In addition, a radio station called "Randa" was used. This station was camouflaged as a Polish resistance group station. The "active" propaganda took its arguments from the delicate political situation of the Polish subjects fighting in the Italian theater of operations. These Polish units were made up of Poles formerly held by the Russians as PWs. The political situation of these Poles was delicate at that time because at the moment they were approaching the German-held section of Italy from the near-East, the Russian arch-enemy was attacking the Polish homeland. In the course of "Unternehmen Suedstern" it became especially apparent that a program dealing fundamentally with high political questions had to be backed up by a strong authority whose consequences reached far beyond the immediate area of command. Examples which seem to justify this statement are as follows: The "active" propaganda of "Unternehmen Suedstern" promised, in spite of fundamental regulations to the contrary, that Poles who deserted from their British leaders would be spared prisoner status and would be immediately sent home. This promise was necessary and its keeping was necessary. It was kept in spite of strong resistance. While the "Unternehmen Suedstern" propaganda appealed to the Roman Catholic feelings of the Polish soldiers, the Gestapo in ERAGON arrested the Polish

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Cardinal BLOND. d'ALQUEM procured his release through HIMMLER. Another example is afforded by the protests of the Governor General FRANK, of Poland. FRANK protested that the pro-Polish argumentation of "Unternehmen Suedstern" had its reaction in his own region in Poland and that the pro-Polish propaganda was contrary to the objectives of the German Military Government of Poland. d'ALQUEM made a counter complaint to HIMMLER and the validity of FRANK's complaint was denied. Later the scope of "Unternehmen Suedstern" was extended to include all propaganda directed at all German enemies in Italy. For the first time, an initial attempt on the part of German psychological warfare had resulted in a lasting institution, an institution which lasted until the war's end.

(5) In May 1944, HIMMLER put his conclusion that "Unternehmen Wintermaerchen" had been a success into practice by ordering that the Standarte start the largest psychological warfare campaign up to that time. This campaign was organized into the area-frame of the largest Heeres Group of the Eastern Front. The front held by this, the largest Heeres Group, was called "Ukraine-South". This psychological warfare campaign was called "Skorpion Ost". With the experience gained from "Unternehmen Wintermaerchen" as a guide, the argumentation of the "Skorpion" propaganda was taken from the "VLASSOV Line". This happened previous to the formation of the VLASSOV Army and before the HIMMLER-VLASSOV cooperation had started. HIMMLER himself, was convinced of this propaganda's success. Only after clear experience had been gathered by the Standarte and not until clear and logical conclusions had been drawn from this experience was the way opened for political recognition of this success. This political recognition inaugurated a new Russia-Policy. The German-held political conception did not carry the propaganda to success. Rather the successful propaganda was forced to forge a tragic detour around the political conception.

(6) The organization of "Skorpion Ost" was preceded by a discussion held between HIMMLER, General von WEDEL and d'ALQUEM. von WEDEL in his position as Chief of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops cooperatively placed all his available forces, approximately sixty (60) officers and six hundred (600) NCO's and enlisted men under d'ALQUEM's command. von WEDEL also transferred all possible material and technical equipment. d'ALQUEM proposed to HIMMLER that he (HIMMLER) take responsibility for the political consequences of the enterprise and HIMMLER testified this responsibility. By this move, the enterprise was isolated from all other political influences and was protected from interference with the power of command by other military headquarters. On this occasion, the first step was made toward the activation of the VLASSOV movement. VLASSOV, himself, remained excluded but the Standarte was given the permission to use the experts available in the VLASSOV center for work within the scope of this enterprise. The success of "Skorpion Ost" resulted in a later creation of similar enterprises called "Skorpion West" (Polish/Western front), "Adria" in the Italian front, as well as other and more limited enterprises within the remaining Heeres groups. Thus, the Standarte took over all of the "active" propaganda of the Wehrmacht and finally Group 5 of OKW/WPR, the department for psychological warfare. The development ended in d'ALQUEM's being appointed as Chief of Propaganda Troops in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Organization
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III-M-2088, S/R Marburg, Reg. III, 7970 CIC Op, APO 872, dtd 6 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEM.

DEVELOPMENT OF EELI NO 5b:

Was this plan designed for immediate front line combat intelligence or was it considered as a long range, stay behind resistance movement aimed at the perpetuation of the German Nationalistic Nazi regime? Did it involve the training of Agents and/or agent networks? If so, exactly how, when, and where was this accomplished and to what degree?

(1) The task of "Skorpion Ost" was that of a special weapon aimed at the alleviation of the Russian pressure exerted on the Eastern Front. The point was to weaken the fighting morale of the enemy. According to previously gained experiences (in "Enterprise Wintermaerchen") this goal could only be reached by propagandizing a national Russian concept. This concept stood in contradiction to the imperialistic Nazi ideology which strived for accumulation of "Lebensraum" and colonial territory at the expense of the Russian peoples. Since these two (?) concepts were incompatible, it would have been impossible to make successful propaganda in the "VLASSOV line" and at the same time kindle a resistance fire in the line of German nationalistic Nazi trends.

(2) Since psychological warfare in the east undertook to assist and further the VLASSOV movement by using members of the movement it was not necessary to train agents. Nor was it necessary to form a network of agents. Once it had decided to cooperate, the VLASSOV movement offered far better opportunities in this direction than could be created by German means. The VLASSOV circle was composed of representatives of all the Russian peoples, of important intellectual forces, of all professional pursuits, of proved military, political and propagandic experts. These people were concentrated in Camp DABENDORF, near BERLIN, for psychological warfare and were trained there. The camp was under the command of General TRUCHIN (Russian) who, earlier, had been the commanding Officer of the Frunze Academy in MOSCOW and who was a proved expert in military psychology.

(3) In the front regions deserters were interrogated by the Standarte's own experts taken from the VLASSOV circle. These interrogations preceded checkings made by the I-C of the army in question. This Standarte's interrogation organization was so specialized that, for instance, a man from Aserbeidschan was interrogated by a man from Aserbeidschan, who, of all nationalities, was best able to determine the genuineness of the other and the truth of his statements. The organization of "Skorpion-Ost" was given access to the Army's information material, that of FAK (Front Aufklarung Kommando) and of the agent service of other areas of command. The Standarte's own liaison officers were charged with this gathering of information from other agencies. Only occasionally were "front crossers" sent by the Standarte through the enemy lines. So special forces were available for this purpose and at that time such action was not necessary.

(4) The fact that the Standart did not avail itself of agent activity was not the outgrowth of a military, political or moral consideration. Rather it grew out of the political aspect of the war, which, in that particular time was not directed at the Russian peoples but against the Bolshevistic system.

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Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEN.

(7) The foregoing summary sets forth in some detail the statement that May 1944 did not mark the beginning of German psychological warfare but that on this date a regrouping and concentration of old and new forces under a new command took place.

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III-M-2088, S/R Marburg, Reg III, 7970 CIC Op, APO 872, dated 5 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEM.

DEVELOPMENT OF EEI NO. 6c.

The SS Standarte "Kurt EGGERS", commanded by SUBJECT, had its headquarters in BERLIN/ZENHENDORF, Heimat 27. The Standarte was organized into the following departments: Administration, Department of the Printed Word, Radio, Film, Pictorial and Art. Was the Standarte responsible for the over-all direction, supervision, and control of the various Skorpion operations, and, if so, how was this accomplished?

(1) The structure of the Standarte as described in the EEI is that of an early date. This description corresponds to the facts up to year 1943 when the unit was restricted to pure war correspondence. The sections mentioned existed in part after 1943 and merely served to continue the war correspondence activities. They had nothing whatever to do with the Standarte's newer tasks in the field of psychological warfare.

(2) d'ALQUEM, as the Standarte's commander, was alone responsible for the organization and leading of the "Skorpion" enterprises as established first in 1943 and later. All command positions in the "Skorpion" enterprise organizations were occupied by selected officers of the Standarte. It had, also, its own checking section for the choosing of Russian officers and EM. The Standarte was in constant wireless connection with BERLIN and the various units concerned with the "Skorpion" operations. This communication means belonged to the Standarte and the Standarte provided all equipment and technical material for the units. The Standarte alone gave political directives and basic orders.

(3) Since the "Skorpion" units were only partly formed of Waffen SS personnel and were not restricted to the Waffen SS's fighting areas and since it was impossible to place the Standarte's commanding officer under the OKW, a special organization solution was found. The Deputy Commander of the Standarte, Major Anton KRIEGRAU, killed in action on 2 May 1945, was appointed chief of Department 5 of OKW/WPR. Hereby the formal claim of leadership of the OKW was outwardly maintained. Department 5 of the OKW/WPR, however, moved their lodgings into the section used by the Standarte. After this move, all experts of the OKW participating in psychological warfare were concentrated in the same area. For a long while "Skorpion Ost" was led by d'ALQUEM personally. The first headquarters of "Skorpion Ost" was located in Symna-Vodl (Galicia), near LEMBERG. From there the other front units and BERLIN could be reached by the Standarte's own courier planes. In summary, the following can be stated: Due to the fact that after 1943 the Commander of the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS", and his deputy were connected with a personal union to Department 5 of the OKW/WPR, the OKW/WPR turned out to be the leading staff of an organization (Skorpion-Ost), which had left its frame of war correspondence completely. This can be said of the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS" as well as of the OKW/WPR. This new form was so little handicapped by organizational difficulties that it could be adapted in a most elastic way to the actual situation and its growing demands.

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III-M-2985, S/R Warburg, Reg III, 7970 CIC Gp, APO 872, dtd 5 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEN.

DEVELOPMENT OF EEI NO. 5d:

Is Subject able to outline the chain of command of departments and personalities from HITLER and HIMMLER down through his organization to the Skorpion project and to actual field operations?

(1) According to the organization plan of the Waffen SS, the Standarte "Kurt BUCKER", was directly under HIMMLER in his capacity as Commander of the Waffen SS in general questions of political and tactical nature. In personnel questions, in questions of ordinary equipment, and of arms and technical equipment, the Standarte was dependent upon the "Command of the Waffen SS", later called the SS Fuehrungshauptamt. In the beginning, relative to its task of war correspondence, the Standarte was under the supervision of the Chief of OKW/WPR (Chief of Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops) and was given directives by the Ministry of Propaganda. For the "Skorpion" organization, the commander of the Standarte (Gunter d'ALQUEN) received his orders directly from HIMMLER. He was ordered to keep HIMMLER constantly informed by writing or wireless. He was ordered to report once monthly to HIMMLER at HIMMLER's headquarters. For a series of orders, HIMMLER applied to HITLER from whom he received corresponding instructions. The official recognition of VLASSOV was the outcome of several discussions between HIMMLER and HITLER. The orders given to the "Skorpion" front line units were issued by d'ALQUEN from the Standarte's headquarters in BERLIN or were personally given at the front during his travels between the "Skorpion" units. It was necessary to use the usual High Command of the Army channels to forward the written order for the "Skorpion" organization. After this one (1) use, regular High Command of the Army channels were not concerned with the Standarte. Upon special occasions and pursuant to special circumstances, the Heeres Groups and armies were informed of circumstances concerning the "Skorpion" enterprises via their own channels. d'ALQUEN informed the High Command of the measures taken and the methods employed by the "Skorpion" enterprises. The "Skorpion" units were never supervised by army units. The Heeres Groups of the area in which the "Skorpion" units were active were merely responsible for the supplies. The I-C of the Heeres Group concerned was not authorized to issue directives or orders. However, closest contact with the I-C was desired from the Standarte's point of view since it was able to impart the current front intelligence necessary for success in psychological warfare. Thus the channels for the politico-propaganda activity of the "Skorpion" units were as short and simple as ever possible; HITLER to HIMMLER to the d'ALQUEN to the "Skorpion" unit.

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III-M-2085, S/R Marburg, Reg III, 7970 CIC Gp, APO 872, dated 5 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEM.

DEVELOPMENT OF EEI NO. 5c:

Is SUBJECT able to furnish a complete list of the RSHA personalities who were associated or connected with the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS" covering the dates 1940-1945?

(1) The Standarte "Kurt EGGERS", the "Skorpion" enterprises and the office of Chief of Wehrmacht propaganda troops had no official connection with the Reichs Sicherheits-Hauptamt and with one (1) exception there was no organizational necessity for this connection. This one (1) exception concerns a Major named von BRADTZKI, who, at the conversation between HIMMLER and VLASSOV in 1944, was appointed liaison officer between the RSHA and the Standarte "Kurt EGGERS" for the exchange of experience and coordination. Occasional contacts not based on any plan, certainly took place at the lower levels out of situation-necessities. Details concerning these contacts could only be ascertained after tedious and comprehensive investigation. In development of this EEI, d'ALQUEM sees a violation of principle (which is discussed in DEVELOPMENT OF EEI 5K), and mentions BRADTZKI'S name only since he knows that the name is known to U.S. authorities for other reasons.

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III-M-2085, S/R Marburg, Reg III, 7970 CIC Gp, APO 872, dated 5 January 1949,
Subject: Cunter d'ALQUEM.

DEVELOPMENT OF EEI NO. 5f:

Did the Kurt EGGERS Division ever have the mission of Counter Intelligence or espionage against the Soviets? If so, exactly what sections of Soviet Intelligence were considered as targets?

(1) Counter Intelligence or espionage against the Soviets was not among the tasks of the Standarte. The results of its work contained, however, material of considerable intelligence value. This by-product of the Standarte's work was passed on to the competent agency, generally the I-C of the area. On the front lines the Standarte's own reconnaissance seekings (EEIs) were restricted to the evaluation of statements made by prisoners and deserters, of statements made in enemy newspapers, in enemy broadcasts, leaflets and private letters. The main points considered in appraisal and evaluation were the questions of general and local troop morale, the inner political and economic situation and the psychologically weak points of the local enemy. The latter points received special consideration because, generally, specific opposing units were wholly made up of a specific Russian nationality. In addition, information concerning the personalities of prominent Soviet commanders was gathered in an attempt to ascertain their weak points. If, after evaluation, weak points were found, psychological propaganda was directed across the lines in an attempt to exploit the weak points of these personalities with the objective of creating confusion and suspicion in the troops and within the minds of those having the power of command over these personalities. In a satisfactory number of cases such efforts to ruin reputations were successful.

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III-M-2088, S/R Marburg, Reg III, 797D CIC Gp, APO 872, dated 5 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEM.

DEVELOPMENT OF ERI NO. 5g:

Is SUBJECT able to reconstruct in detail the circumstances surrounding the final acceptance of the VLASSOV Army? Who, in particular, were the top ranking officers with whom SUBJECT had contact? Also, what are the particulars as to why, when, and where contact was made?

(1) Differentiation is necessary between the fictitious idea of an army led by VLASSOV and the actual existing formation of such an army under the command of VLASSOV and other Russian officers. The "SMOLENSK Committee" fiction of 1942 had been only one (1) propaganda move involving the use of the "VLASSOV line" to deteriorate enemy troop morale. The single units of volunteers, generally under the flags of one (1) of the Russian peoples, which were set up by German Army units in a more or less arbitrary way before VLASSOV himself was officially recognized, belong to this fictitious idea of a VLASSOV Army. In "active" propaganda, before the official recognition and installation of VLASSOV, these units were called "VLASSOV units" but they were under German command, had German officers and had no organizational connection with one another. The enterprise "Skorpion-Ost" was the decisive step toward the actual formation of the VLASSOV Army. The cooperation of VLASSOV generals and other VLASSOV officers in this enterprise resulted in a further development toward the formation of the VLASSOV Army. This was, so as to speak, an automatic consequence. (It is the opinion of the undersigned Agent that d'ALQUEM, from the first, anticipated this "automatic consequence" as well as his future use of it as a speaking point to convince HIMMLER of VLASSOV's utility). Experience gained from "Wintermaerchen" indicated that the Russians could, propagandically, be best influenced in the general "VLASSOV line". This limitation of propagandic possibilities was posed because the Nazi Russia policy had ruined other opportunities. The direction of "Skorpion-Ost's" propaganda seemed clear. Shortly after the issuance of orders for the "Skorpion Ost" organization, d'ALQUEM, together with his deputy, met the leading men of the VLASSOV circle in his home in BERLIN, Kronprinzessinweg 16. d'ALQUEM had been ordered not to contact VLASSOV personally, so VLASSOV was not present at this meeting. Since selection of Russian collaborators was permitted, there was a regulational pretext for the meeting. The Russians present were: General SHILENEV, later Chief of VLASSOV's propaganda apparatus; General MALEY-SCHIK, later VLASSOV's Chief of Staff; General TRUCHIN, later VLASSOV's Military Chief of Staff; Colonel WACHAROW, VLASSOV's Adjutant and a Captain WOLINSKI who had been, until 1939, Chief editor of the MOSKOW daily paper "Istwestija". (The following night WOLINSKI was kidnapped and never found though a painstaking search was made. In a conversation with von GROTHE on 16 November 1948, von GROTHE stated to the undersigned Agent that WOLINSKI had been kidnapped and assassinated by a low level Gestapo headquarters and that this assassination was motivated by Gestapo operations with Russian emigrant groups between which there was rivalry. The Gestapo, having no idea of WOLINSKI's role at the time of the kidnapping, killed him in order to establish operational credit with one (1) of the

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groups. This side light is typical of the Nazi party's confused Russian policy at that time). General ~~SHILENKOFF~~ became the main Russian collaborator in the Staff of "Skorpion Ost". At the beginning of the war, SHILENKOFF was a high political commissar in MOSKOW and was immediately assigned to General ZHUKOV's Army as political commissar. SHILENKOFF finally became Deputy Commander of the 34th Soviet Army which was surrounded and annihilated near VJASMA in the autumn of 1941. SHILENKOFF was taken prisoner without being recognized and spent eight months in anonymity as a PW chauffeur. Apart from his irregular periods of drunkenness, SHILENKOFF was intelligent, dependable and had a comprehensive knowledge of Russia. For several months he worked both at the "Skorpion-Ost" front headquarters and the Standarte's central area in BERLIN. Almost daily personal contact existed between him and d'ALQUEN. SHILENKOFF made a large contribution to the political knowledge used in "Skorpion Ost".

(2) d'ALQUEN reasoned that the high Nazi apprehensiveness could be more easily lulled into a mood sceptive of the "VLASSOV line" if VLASSOV's strong personality and undeniable personal appeal could be insulated from the movement. The only possible substitute for VLASSOV worth considering, from d'ALQUEN's viewpoint, was SHILENKOFF. An attempt was made to bring about this SHILENKOFF - as - VLASSOV's proxy development in a frank conversation between SHILENKOFF and d'ALQUEN. In this conversation SHILENKOFF was told of the reasons for the political quarantine surrounding VLASSOV and of the practical political difficulties that must be overcome before VLASSOV was placed at the head of an armed force of Russians. This attempt failed because of SHILENKOFF's loyalty to VLASSOV and because of VLASSOV's authority, which became clearer and stronger with the passage of time. Therefore, d'ALQUEN had to force the next step, namely VLASSOV's official appointment. HIMMLER was carefully prepared for a future discussion concerning VLASSOV by furnishing him with information which he could not criticize. The information which made the most favorable impression upon HIMMLER was that of the successful experience with "Skorpion-Ost", the skill and behavior of the collaborating Russian officers, the success of the PAULUS-SEYDLITZ enterprise of the Soviets, the fact that VLASSOV's authority was becoming more and more apparent and, of course, the pressure of the military situation. The beginning of the Soviet summer offensive in 1944 finally forced HIMMLER's decision. On 13 July 1944 d'ALQUEN made a trip to HIMMLER's headquarters in SALZBURG (Austria). After a four (4) hour conversation in a train enroute to HITLER's headquarters, located at that time in East Prussia, HIMMLER stated that he would attempt to change HITLER's opinion (up until that time HITLER had been surrounded by "Russia experts" from the old Czaristic emigrant groups. To these persons, VLASSOV and his ideas were anathema) and permitted d'ALQUEN to contact VLASSOV personally.

(3) Their first conversation took place at the Standarte headquarters in BERLIN-Zehlendorf on 15 July 1944. VLASSOV left the impression of a great personality, proved to be well-informed about current developments and gave a declaration of confidence in d'ALQUEN. The descriptions by VLASSOV of his disappointments, the never-kept promises and of his personal situation, barely in keeping with that of a puppet army leader, were appalling hints of an incapable,

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unstable policy without principles. His criticism of the situation and the measures employed were honest and without mercy. Nevertheless, he showed optimism and believed that a decisive influence could still be exerted by an immediate mass-action of the Russian forces within Germany at that time. For the first time the problem of the national Russian activation of the millions of East Workers (later called EWs) was touched. (In this question, up to that time, d'ALQUEN had met the strongest opposition from the German Security Police. VLASSOV made proposals as follows:

- (a) That VLASSOV battalions scattered everywhere be concentrated.
- (b) That divisions of Russians be formed under Russian command and that these divisions be dispatched on front command under the High Command of VLASSOV.
- (c) That a large scale propaganda action in the "VLASSOV line" be organized by d'ALQUEN and SHILENKOPF.
- (d) The stopping of German actions to further separatistic tendencies of single Russian states.
- (e) The ceasing of contact between Germans and these separatistically inclined Russian leaders.
- (f) That he (VLASSOV) be responsible to only one (1) person (he stated that he was exasperated at the previous failure to carry his program caused by a multitude of incompetencies).

VLASSOV's immediate aim was the creation of a national Russian Army with the eventual aim of furthering a political program on a federal basis in Russia. VLASSOV accepted HIMMLER as his immediately superior resort, asked that one (1) German political observer be assigned to his staff, requested that immediate means be placed at his disposal and that HITLER make a clear-cut decision. Two (2) days later d'ALQUEN reported to HIMMLER in HIMMLER's headquarters and HIMMLER revealed HITLER's basic approval of VLASSOV's activation and of VLASSOV's subordination to HIMMLER. HIMMLER also stated that he himself had been given a free hand in this direction. HIMMLER proved to be fundamentally in agreement to VLASSOV's proposals and planned to officially appoint him as "Marshal of the Russian Liberation Army". HIMMLER foresaw organizational difficulties with BORMANN and with the army and was not against the idea of politically and militarily activating the workers from the East. For this East Worker activation he proposed to establish a political coordination section for the instrumentation of this activation in the SS Hauptamt, which later came under his control. HIMMLER directed d'ALQUEN to inform the chief of the Security Police accordingly. HIMMLER stated at this meeting that he wished to confer with VLASSOV personally on 21 July 1944. This was interrupted by the plot against HITLER's life on 20 July 1944. After this plot, HIMMLER became Chief of all reserve troops located in German territory (Chef der Ersatztruppen) and was thus himself, empowered to take action toward the VLASSOV activation which he did in 1944. In two (2) military trafficking

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carps, located in Southern Germany, the formation of the new, "genuine" VLASSOV units was begun. In a conversation with d'ALQUEN, General KUELLER, Chief of the Security Police, at first protested against VLASSOV's influence on the workers from the east for security reasons. In KUELLER's opinion a great danger would arise which would find its expression in strikes and other methods of pressure. Later KUELLER became convinced of the necessity of the VLASSOV action and appointed a representative of his interests for liaison with the VLASSOV movement.

(4) VLASSOV declined to accept the rank of Marshal which he wanted to acquire at the front. The invasion of France brought along a setback. Several "VLASSOV" units located there as police and guard units, could not be withdrawn. They had no political orientation, had poor leadership and were scattered. They fought, almost without exception, and were destroyed. Within some Cossack and Ukrainian units located in Germany some resistance against VLASSOV's alleged centralism became apparent but only in leading circles. On 16 September the first discussion between VLASSOV and HIMMLER took place. d'ALQUEN and Colonel KRUEGER, a representative of the SS Hauptamt were present. In this conversation which took place in HIMMLER's headquarters at RASTENBURG (Coord. Unk.) in East Prussia, the basic lines of the VLASSOV policy were fixed. VLASSOV was appointed Supreme Commander of the Russian Liberation Army with the authority of a Colonel-General. He was authorized to promote Russian officers up to the rank of Colonel and to assign them to positions according to his own will. An order was issued that two (2) Russian divisions would be immediately established and three (3) more at short intervals. It was ordered that all Russian forces in Germany, after being relieved of their immediate duty, would be placed under the command of VLASSOV. Colonel KRUEGER was appointed HIMMLER's representative in VLASSOV's staff. d'ALQUEN was made responsible for the evaluation of the consequences of the new program in Russia with the object of using these consequences as a base for psychological warfare. After difficult discussions and careful preparation, the convention of PRAGUE, attended by anti-Bolshevik representatives of all the Russian peoples, was concluded. In this convention, VLASSOV was appointed chief of all Russian anti-Bolshevik forces.

(5) General difficulties of the war and the production situation delayed the formation and equipping of the new Russian forces. In the spring of 1945 the first purely Russian, the 502nd Infantry Division, had completed its training, was equipped with good artillery and was ready for action. The division had only a few German liaison officers in its staff and had no German "Framework personnel". VLASSOV, together with d'ALQUEN, inspected this division on Easter 1945. The Russian division's reaction to the appearance of VLASSOV was convincingly enthusiastic. This, the 502nd Infantry Division, was the first real and officially sanctioned ingredient of the VLASSOV Army to participate in military operations. This division had a surprising starting success in the battle of the Oder, during which Colonel SACHAROV, VLASSOV's Adjutant, acted meritoriously and was mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht (Army Report). With high losses, this division won a bridgehead on the Oder before being drawn into the whirl of the retreat.

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DEVELOPMENT OF LEEI NO. 54

What was the final outcome and disposition of the VLASSOV Movement at the time of capitulation? Did remnants of the VLASSOV Army fight against the German Army with the Czechs in PRAGUE? What was the basic reason for this turn about on the part of the VLASSOV outfits concerned?

(1) d'ALQUEN, meanwhile having been appointed Chief of Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops, could only judge these events from information which he, himself, received. Beforehand, it is necessary to state the following: SHILENKOFF, who was especially talkative under alcoholic influence, spoke with d'ALQUEN about the consequences of Germany's defeat. SHILENKOFF told of the views held in VLASSOV's officer Corps. According to SHILENKOFF's statements, these officers held the view that they and their troops would be of value to the west. SHILENKOFF claimed that the VLASSOV officers hold the idea that the West would continue the war in action against Russia after Germany's defeat. The Germans gave VLASSOV a headquarters in the vicinity of KARLSBAD. In his units there was a trend to gather in this area with the idea of breaking through to the Southeast in order to escape the Soviets and to wait for further developments with the eventual hope of asylum in the west. The 502nd Infantry Division and several other units, both large and small, succeeded in reaching BOHEMIA, partly by the force of weapons, and partly by forming "Igelstellungen". (Igelstellungen is the German for porcupines. In military usage it is applied to a maneuver of defense in all directions).

(2) The turning of weapons in PRAGUE against the German ally was the outgrowth of an error which was not made by the VLASSOV troops alone. On the basis of information, considered at that time to be reliable, the VLASSOV troops expected General PATTON to continue to PRAGUE. With this in mind, the VLASSOV troops wanted to arrange favorable consequences for themselves by giving PRAGUE as a present to the Americans. According to d'ALQUEN, who claims to have exact knowledge of the situation at that time, any other possibility accounting for the turnabout can be excluded and the supposition that such a final act could have been made in favor of the Soviets is idiotic. Even at an earlier time, when the Soviets were troubled with their own fighting morale, at a time when the weakening of the German fighting was a big problem for the Soviets, such an act would not have made sense. It would have made less sense at a time when the Soviet advance had become a steam roller. The supposition that the turnabout was made in favor of the Soviets does not make sense because these men knew the Soviets better than anyone else. I have no doubt that these men would have, at any point of the war, considered such an act pure suicide. Their despair gave birth to the error that they could keep a door open toward the west and this error explains the turning of weapons by single units in PRAGUE. The attitude of VLASSOV and his staff after the surrender lies in the same Western direction. They, too, believed up to the last in an open door to the west and did not take into account that they would be extradited to the Russians.

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DEVELOPMENT OF XEI NO. 31:

Was the VLASSOV Army penetrated by Soviet Agents? Does SUBJECT have any knowledge as to the identity of the agents and particularly their missions, methods of operation, communication, and degree of penetration through the VLASSOV people of the German Command?

(1) When the VLASSOV troops were first organized, the Germans considered their penetration by Soviet Agents as an unavoidable evil. The German leadership was quite surprised when no systematic attempt became obvious. Apparently it was never made. Many reasons perhaps exist to explain this absence of a systematic attempt.

(2) Constant suspicion and fear of espionage, through Bolshevistic educational work, has become part of the Russian character. For this reason anti-Bolshevist troop units were immune to Bolshevist infiltration to a higher degree than non-Russian units. In the non-Russian units, none but the professional counter espionage men were the bearers of intelligent and educated suspicion. The Soviet propaganda against the VLASSOV troops was very clumsy. It threatened the single man with death and did not build him a bridge to repentance, to home and re-conciliation. By this, an automatically acting protection against temptation was established, since yielding to temptation was suicide. The VLASSOV units in the camp were surveilled by the SD. Only occasionally single agents of no greater importance were registered. There was a conviction on the part of the SD that the Soviets did not succeed in penetration. The Soviet counter-propaganda disclosed that it did not know what was going on in the interior of these units. If it had known of many conditions and circumstances within these units it could have used the knowledge with great success. Only incidentally, but somewhat indicative, is the fact that the Russian volunteers were at their best when they were against their Bolshevistic enemy. By European Standards they were mediocre in France but, by the same standards, the Cossack units who fought the Communist partisans in the Balkans were excellent. Only one (1) case, which occurred during the front activity of "Skorpion-Ost" seemed significant to d'ALQUEM. It concerned one (1) Russian VLASSOV officer who deserted to the Soviets. This officer was in possession of certain knowledge which could have been used propagandically, therefore evaluation and action by the Soviet propaganda was awaited by the Germans with high concern. Since nothing unusual happened, it was assumed that he was no agent. The German concern that Russian volunteers would become a hot-bed for Bolshevistic agitation was for a long time the main argument against the VLASSOV Army. The VLASSOV Russians knew this state of affairs and tried to furnish evidence that the German suspicion was unfounded. The statements of single members of VLASSOV units after the break-down can hardly furnish a clear picture. In their distress they used all arguments and opportunities to protect themselves against the consequences of the Yalta Agreement. Statements have been heard from home-coming PWs that in 1948 among their successors in the hard labor camps east of the Urals were large groups from the former VLASSOV Army. If these former VLASSOV Army men had been disguised Communists they would not have received such treatment even from the Soviets.

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DEVELOPMENT OF EEI NO. 54:

What is SUBJECT'S appraisal and estimate of the successes and failures of the German plan of psychological warfare as conducted by the "Kury EGONRS" division and the Skorpion operations?

(1) A basic principle concerning psychological warfare is that its degree of success cannot be exactly measured. It is exceptionally difficult to bring a one hundred (100%) per cent soldier to believe this fact. It is the aim of psychological warfare to weaken the morale and, consequently, the combat strength of the enemy. The degree to which a single effort contributed to a success can hardly be appraised. Only in rare instances can one establish the opponent's fighting strength previous to his exposure to propaganda influence. Only one part of the success can be measured, namely the number of deserters. Out of the deserter figures and their rising and receding trends one can make careful conclusions regarding the interior value of the troops. The deserter is always the symptom of a latent moral defect.

(2) In the area of the Heeres Group Ukraine-South before the activation of "Skorpion Ost" in May-June 1944, the number of Soviet deserters averaged 200 monthly. In the first month after the activation, the deserters numbered 3,600. In July 1944, the deserters totalled 4,500. In spite of negative German military efforts in the Summer of 1944, and in spite of the beginning of a Russian offensive, the monthly average was kept up to approximately 3,600 deserters in the area of this Heeres Group alone. During the period that followed, the success could only be tabulated locally and not centrally.

(3) The military value of the deserter fluctuates with the general situation. In the East, in many cases, his personnel value was doubled since he represented not only a loss in fighting power of the enemy but also a gain in the fighting power of the Germans. As a rule, the deserter was a volunteer for VLASSOV. Due to the fact that he deserted for this definite purpose he had to be included in the category of the good and not the bad soldiers. He did not desert merely to quit fighting. The deserter is always the bearer of good military, political and psychological information. In the East those who deserted to become VLASSOV soldiers arrived with the intention of giving this information. As a rule, the successful unit has less deserters than a unit in a bad situation. The Soviets, in the Summer of 1944, had a long series of impressive successes behind. They, nevertheless, lost many deserters. The psychological warfare made by "Skorpion Ost" must, then, have awakened hitherto dormant consciousnesses; it must have either hit the vulnerable point exactly or it must have aggravated political and moral defects. The deserter figures, as given, seemed too low to the "Skorpion" statistics personnel. They had doubts about their own and the figures' accuracy. The infantry was accorded special favors for increased prisoner figures such as furloughs. In spite of strict orders many Soviet deserters were registered as prisoners. For this good evidence existed. Out of the newly taken prisoners in the camps near the front there were many who immediately upon their arrival volunteered for the VLASSOV army. This was contrary

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to expectation. The deserter figures as given before, plus the fact that even the German troops believed in psychological warfare's effectiveness, seems clear evidence of "Skorpion-Ost's" success. During "Skorpion Ost", the military leadership, for the first time, placed confidence in a weapon, which, up until that time, had been viewed with suspicion and disregard. Field Marshal MODEL stated of "Skorpion", on the occasion of his first meeting with d'ALQUEM on 21 June 1944, "You are cheaper." MODEL's speech figure meant that one needed more men and material to rain the same number of prisoners by other means. From MODEL's conviction came all the support to "Skorpion" that he was able to give. From the viewpoint of "Skorpion's" personnel, MODEL's reaction was pleasant but his reaction, nevertheless, was typical of the short-sighted judgment shown by one hundred per cent soldiers of a psychological weapon whose success is not to be measured by mathematics alone. By far the greatest success of "Skorpion-Ost" was that it furnished convincing proof to the German leadership that the VLASSOV propaganda concept was the correct one. Naturally the form of the pressure being exerted upon Germany contributed to the German leadership's acceptance of the concept. Nevertheless, under all circumstances, the correctness of a propagandized political concept has to be proved. Before "Skorpion", the VLASSOV concept was one theory among many. Only after the fact that it was proved by psychological warfare against Bolshevism did it become a convincing argument. This proves the limitlessness of possibilities for success in all directions. A psychological warfare success infiltrates from the military regions to the political. Successful psychological warfare not only produces an effect upon the enemy but upon one's own political and military leadership as well. Successful psychological warfare uncovers arguments that cannot be obtained elsewhere.

(4) If only one single weapon among many is successful during a period of military set-backs, little imagination is required to calculate that under more favorable conditions this weapon would be more successful. The fact that this weapon alone was successful gives it an authority. This authority has a favorable effect on the general as well as on its own particular situation. It was proved that psychological warfare is a weapon highly immune to crises, that it is a weapon which can create or support authority. Even HIMMLER's authority could not have justified an unproved theory. The success of "Skorpion-Ost" convinced HIMMLER and gave him the necessary power of penetration to push through d'ALQUEM's proposal that the VLASSOV concept be exploited by "active" propaganda. The successes of "Skorpion Ost" forced HIMMLER into the prescribed direction, that is to say, HIMMLER embraced the VLASSOV concept since its practicability was proved by "Skorpion Ost". The success of "Skorpion-Ost" was possible only after clear definition of authority and uniformity of means and methods were arranged. Only after this weapon, for which no tradition or model existed, had succeeded in arranging these prerequisites of success was it possible for it to show externally visible progress. Behind the scenes in a totalitarian state there are multiple forces and authorities at play which impede any new development. In a state which countenances the free play of energies, these impediments to new developments are not so vigorous. It is a general rule that this weapon must win a psychological war in the interior before the war can be waged toward the outside.

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(6) There are ideas, of course, which are independent of the situation that can be implemented into psychological warfare successes. Since psychological warfare proved its efficiency, since it became able, in a high degree, to isolate itself from possible mistakes, a large number of evaluated principles and experiences were accumulated which should be of continued value under conditions similar to those under which they were accumulated.

(6) Many experts hold the view today that Germany could have won the war in the East if she had begun psychological warfare in the VLASSOV line in 1941. This is right as far as theory is concerned. Since circumstances at that time opposed obstacles to its implementation, such a statement remains theory.

(7) Psychological warfare means the transformation of policy into military capacity. As every other weapon it was born out of necessity. This necessity was not visible to the German military leadership until the conservative and orthodox means were no longer successful. The fundamental ideas of psychological warfare were opposed by the arrogant victor who had reached his goal in Poland and France by the help of an inflexible political system. This intoxication and the errors which grew out of wishfully-illusionary information resulted in an under-estimation of the Eastern enemy. Even those who repudiated the Nazi ideology of "Lebensraum" acted on the principle, "let us first win and then all other things will automatically fall into their proper place."

(8) The basic ideas of psychological warfare originate from the civilian areas of business advertising and political propaganda. During the French campaign, the German propaganda network which was steered by civilians had a positive and valuable military effect. But, because of the Soviets' collective radio control, this experience had no value in the East. Here "active" propaganda had to be a discriminatingly directed weapon and had to be added to military-tactical action. But for one hundred per cent militarists, a weapon is only that which shoots, stabs or explodes. Those officers of the OKW/HPR who knew more about those things were considered disguised civilians and were not taken seriously. For instance, after considering the variation of nationalities of which the Red Army is constructed, the idea was conceived by OKW/HPR that German men and material could be saved by addressing a Turkestan unit in its own mentality in order to diminish its already low readiness for war. To one hundred per cent soldiers, the idea that these disguised civilians deserved victory credit was unacceptable. The idea, when instrumented, was a success, but its success was depreciated by the one hundred per cent militarists. So even the most modest successes of psychological warfare were in the beginning, repudiated. First attempts had to be made by outsiders on their own.

(9) Peacetime preparations for psychological warfare turned out, in retrospect, to have been no more than modest theories. These preparations were handled by honorable desk-officers with no political or military authority. Various excuses can be offered for the failure to form psychological warfare units in the manner later established as correct but the expense of their training and equipment cannot

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be considered an excuse. One single anti-aircraft battery costs more than one well-equipped propaganda unit. But an efficient propaganda unit is of much more worth, even in a military respect, than the best AA battery.

(10) In the beginning, the "active" propaganda platoons attached to the propaganda companies could wage nothing which could be called psychological warfare on a large scale. In the main, their activities extended to those areas near the front lines occupied by the civilian population. They were not adapted to, nor were they provided for, over-all tactical use in exploiting Soviet morale weaknesses. Nor were they in a position to evaluate on a large scale. They worked with "timed propaganda", leaflets and records which had been made in the back areas with no anticipation of the constantly changing requirements of the front. The small units under different and labyrinthine channels of command had resort to no authority that could keep promises in the back areas that they made to the enemy at the front. It was senseless to promise good treatment to deserters since there was nobody to guarantee it. It was senseless to promise a Ukrainian soldier liberty since he knew the system of Reich-Commissar KOCH was working. Many blunders were made because the realization was slow in coming that the front line is no iron curtain. Information and rumors cross the front line as quickly as propaganda. In the long run, propaganda can only be effective if it conforms to the facts.

(11) On the Soviet side they knew very quickly that the "peaceful reconstruction" meant compulsory labor for the Wehrmacht and for the German civil administration. Before "Skorpion", the "timed propaganda" emphasized that the Germans did not fight the peoples of Russia but only the system. The army, then in contradiction, fought entire Russia according to the principles of non-political generals who considered any propaganda baloney and who adhered to centuries-old war experience. The concept which "Skorpion-Ost" furthered, grew out of the very gradual recognition of the mistakes made during the war years. The activation of this concept marked the beginnings of psychological warfare. Before, it existed only as an unrelated bundle of ideas.

(12) In 1942, VLASSOV propaganda was being made in the areas of Heeres group Middle Russia. But not even the clear success of this propaganda had any influence upon the military leadership. It was not until 1944 that it was realized that Propaganda successes are short-lived and will have the contrary effect when propaganda and reality are not coordinated. Although the "Skorpion-Ost" activities were fundamentally in the right line, there were mistakes made there, of course. Since there WAS no contributing tradition or model, one could learn only the trial and error method. Most mistakes owed their origin to the information material from which the propaganda received its theses, to descriptions of Russia furnished by political emigrants (re: Agent Report, S/R Marburg, Marburg file II-M-2085, Subject: VLASSOV Liberation Movement, paragraph b(1)(k), and to political literature and political prejudices. One example of this is that for a long time the German propaganda used the "evil" Commissar. In the eyes of the Russian soldiers, however, he was not an evil but a good man who wrote their letters and attended to their personal problems as he had learned to do in the Soviet schools.

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(13) Mistakes were contained in every leaflet that was not coordinated in time and place. The propaganda brochures and leaflets had to be designed at the front and printed rapidly at the front. Propaganda bearing ammunition fired by heavy artillery, in most cases, had to be loaded back home. These shells, therefore, contained out-dated literature of nearly idiotic contents. It was necessary to dispense with heavy artillery and to use airplanes and mortars instead.

(14) The propaganda units, proud of their speed at work, liked to become involved in polemic with the enemy. These efforts could only be successful if the arguments were convincingly quick-witted. Over-refinement, subtlety, and sophistry brought about the contrary to the intention. A frequent source of mistakes was the tendency to project the German and not the Russian mentality into the propaganda bearing mediums aimed at the Soviets. For instance, Soviet leaflets advised German soldiers to mutilate themselves by putting a foot under a common wheel. The Germans considered the use of this method of self-mutilation so improbable that they declined to give the Russians the same poor advice. No soldier, the Germans thought, would do such a thing. Later on Soviet deserters disclosed that this method especially was used by the Soviet soldiers.

(15) The tendency to assume that the enemy had the same spiritual standard had to be fought constantly. There were pretty leaflets which had no effect whatsoever on the Russians since the Russians did not know what to do with the contents or the graphic set up. Primitive leaflets with, what was for a European, very, very primitive pictures, enjoyed the best reception. For a long while the religious potentialities were over-estimated. Leaflets with religious contents, pious addresses broadcast by loudspeakers, religious hymns and similar methods in this line had no success whatsoever due to the fact that religious things play hardly any role in the lives of the younger Soviet citizens. A similar observation was made of allusions to oppositional trends within the Communist party. Sexual propaganda directed at the Russians was a still-born child. This sort of propaganda was more successful in the West. Attempts of large-scale radio programs were soon abandoned. Interrogation of deserters showed that Russians up to the High Command Echelons did not have free access to the radio. Therefore, the radio efforts were restricted to a series of small stations who had the task of addressing Russian tanks and Signal Corps units. Single complicated actions where combined propaganda means were used did not turn out to be productive. The German, who revels in technical and organizational perfection, adapted himself to the Russian mentality only with reluctance. This mentality is most open to the non-intellectual and primitive methods of overflowing and suffocation. The relatively simple system of dropping leaflets in huge masses from airplanes seemed to be the best one. The Soviets paralyzed the effects of paper-sparing, isolated German propaganda actions by prohibiting the picking up of leaflets. With their own experience as a criterion, the Germans, for a long time depreciated this prohibition. They forgot that this prohibition was a Soviet prohibition and of corresponding vigor. Finally, actions by Stukas were decided upon. These planes could drop great masses of leaflets contained in special bombs with precision on selected targets. Even the Soviet prohibition to pick them up failed in its objective since the leaflets were to be found in all trenches of the selected area, in all fox holes, shelters and latrines.

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III-N-2086, S/R Warburg, Ser III, 790 CIC Gp, APO 872, dated 6 January 1949,
Subject: Gunter d'ALQUEM

(16) Often the German fighting units were disturbed and irritated by the use of technical means such as by the considerable, position-betraying flash of leaflet-shooting rocket projectors. During their own assault the German units disliked propaganda activities. Technical means had to be developed by which the troops were not adversely affected or other means had to be found by which the propaganda activity could be fitted into the periods before and after the attack. The best of relations with ground forces was a prerequisite for successful work. For this reason, only good soldiers could be used in propaganda units, since only good soldiers can earn a soldierly reputation and conduct themselves self-confidently. Whenever non-German assistants were treated with suspicion and caution, set-backs caused by ill-humor, indifference and bashfulness resulted. The indigenous helpers had a difficult stand in their new units which were always afraid of spies. These helpers had to be screened beforehand but during their missions and during their personal contacts with the Germans they had to be given equal rights and consideration; their opinions had to be accorded the same respect and an equal share in the success had to be insured.

(17) A prolific source of mistakes in such a propaganda unit is its independence of the local power of command. For this reason considerable diplomatic talent and skill are required of its leader. He must not show his independence, not to speak of his deriving too much benefit from it. He must interest the fighting units in the activities of his unit; he must ask local agencies for advice, use, or appear to use this advice and be a welcome guest with them. It is a trait of psychological warfare that its effects are felt in all directions. He who turns out to be a poor psychologist in his own field can have only a moderate success against the enemy. Methods used to convince the enemy must be convincing in all directions. The fighting units must get the impression that they have efficient assistance. As with every weapon, this one too realizes its greatest penetration force only if it is used in coordination with other weapons. Out of the successes and failures of psychological warfare generally valid principles have been developed. These principles are not less timeless and constant than the component elements of other special weapons.

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